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Abstract 
Unemployment is a critical life event that may affect the income 
trajectories of displaced workers very unequally. It may trigger a process 
of cumulative disadvantage and hit vulnerable groups hardest. 
Alternatively, it may level the playing field because higher classes have 
more to lose. We analyze heterogeneous effects of an unemployment spell 
on income for Britain and Switzerland. Our analysis is based on two 
household panels – UK Understanding Society 2009-2017 and the Swiss 
Household Panel 1999-2017 – and distinguishes two sources of income, 
from the labor market and welfare state, at two different levels, the 
individual and households. We match unemployed to employed workers 
and estimate fixed-effects regressions. Our results show that individual 
labor income drops in the two years after an unemployment spell by 20 
and 25% in Switzerland and by 25 and 55% in the UK. Welfare state 
transfers reduce these losses by half in Switzerland, but have only a 
marginal impact in the UK at both the individual and household level. In 
both countries, income losses do not differ much across social classes. We 
thus find no evidence for a cumulative disadvantage. The lower classes 
are at greater risk of becoming unemployed, but this does not 
automatically translate into greater vulnerability to its consequences.  
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Introduction 
Losing a job is a critical life event that may completely alter an individual’s economic 
trajectory (DiPrete 2002, Gangl 2006, Brandt and Hank 2014). Yet as new jobs are constantly 
created and old jobs destroyed, unemployment may also constitute a purely transitory 
parenthesis in the careers of many workers (Farber 1999, Davis et al. 2006). The large spectrum 
of possible outcomes – from short-term bumps to long-term scarring – raises the prospect that 
unemployment affects the careers of population groups very unequally. While workers in 
subordinate class positions may be particularly vulnerable to its consequences, workers in more 
privileged class positions may bounce back more easily to a job.  
Our paper examines whether the income consequences of an unemployment spell are 
stratified by individuals’ social class. We thus join a handful of longitudinal studies in 
sociology that analyse heterogeneous effects of unemployment on income (McManus and 
DiPrete 2000, Ehlert 2012, 2013, Grotti 2016). Our analysis combines the perspectives of the 
life course and social stratification. Depending on how an individual’s material resources and 
constraints – his or her own class position – interact with a critical life event, unemployment 
may have purely fleeting consequences or constitute a crucial turning point in the career. 
On this issue, the literature offers two conflicting accounts. Unemployment may trigger a 
process of cumulative disadvantage that hits vulnerable groups hardest, notably the working 
class (DiPrete and McManus 2000). Or, on the contrary, an unemployment spell may level the 
playing field because higher-earnings classes have more to lose (Gangl 2006). Rather than 
increasing income inequality, an unemployment spell would then reshuffle the cards across 
income groups.  
The economic literature on job displacement typically focuses on the consequences of 
unemployment for work income (e.g. Jacobsen et al. 1993, Couch and Placzek 2010). However, 
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people’s life chances do not only depend on their success on the labour market. Two other 
institutions potentially compensate the earnings losses due to unemployment: the welfare state 
through social benefits and the family through the household pooling of resources (Esping-
Andersen 1999). A second contribution of our analysis is to separate the incomes stemming 
from the market (earnings) and the state (taxes and transfers). By further distinguishing income 
flows at the individual and household level, we show how the pooling of income within 
households buffers workers against economic insecurity during periods of unemployment 
(DiPrete and McManus 2000, Ehlert 2012).  
The extent to which different institutions provide an income during an unemployment spell 
is likely to vary across countries. The classical comparison in the literature is between Germany 
and the United States (e. g. McManus and DiPrete 2000, Gangl 2004, Ehlert 2012, Grotti 2016). 
Our study focuses on a different contrast and compares the income effect of unemployment 
between Britain and Switzerland. While Switzerland has an occupational labour market with 
strong links between vocational education and employment, the United Kingdom comes closer 
to an internal labour market where general education and on-the-job training dominate 
(Marsden 1990). Likewise, their welfare states were inspired by different architects: Beveridge 
and minimum income schemes are central for Britain, Bismarck and status-conserving social 
insurances for Switzerland (Bonoli 1997).  
When analysing the income effect of unemployment, a central concern is selection bias and 
thus the presence of characteristics that affect both workers’ risk of becoming unemployed and 
their subsequent incomes (Brand 2015: 362). We address this concern with a difference-in-
differences design. The idea is to combine an individual-level fixed-effects model with a 
matching method that provides us with a control group of workers who did not become 
unemployed. We examine the evolution of income two years before and three years after the 
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beginning of an unemployment spell on the basis of two household panels: Understanding 
Society 2009-2017 for the UK and the Swiss Household Panel 1999-2017 for Switzerland.  
In what follows, our Theory section will present the idea of heterogeneous effects of 
unemployment on income and discuss the three institutions that provide individuals with an 
income: the market, state and family. Our Methods and Data section introduces the household 
panels and outlines the advantage of combining a matching method with a fixed-effects 
regression. Our Results section shows findings for overall income loss after unemployment in 
the UK and Switzerland and then disaggregates these losses for different income sources and 
social classes. The conclusion summarizes the results and outlines their implications for the 
concept of cumulative disadvantage. 
Stratified effects of unemployment on income 
There is ample evidence that workers in lower class positions face greater risks of becoming 
unemployed than workers in the upper-middle class (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006, Oesch 
2010, OECD 2013: 34). However, being at greater risk of experiencing an event does not 
automatically translate into larger vulnerability to its consequences. Unemployment may set in 
motion two different mechanisms. It may activate a process of cumulative disadvantage where 
the financial hardship of less advantaged groups further increases over time (DiPrete and Eirich 
2006). Alternatively, it may initiate a process of regression to the mean where social classes at 
the top fall from greater heights than classes at the bottom whose income is cushioned by the 
welfare state’s floor effect. 
These processes lead to two opposing predictions. On the one hand, workers in higher class 
positions earn higher wages and have more to lose from unemployment – in relative and, above 
all, absolute terms – than workers in subordinate positions whose market earnings may not be 
far from the minimum level of social benefits. On the other hand, workers in higher class 
6 
 
positions also possess more resources to cope with unemployment. They tend to be part of 
social networks that provide more information and influence on job vacancies (Oesch and  von 
Ow 2017) and they tend to benefit from greater financial means, both in terms of personal 
savings and unemployment benefits, which may allow them to hold out longer until they find 
an adequate job (Schmelzer 2011).  
Unemployment often leads to earnings losses because job- and firm-specific skills devaluate 
when workers have to change employer. While access to the professions and management often 
requires higher education and thus a form of credentialed general skills, the working class may 
depend more strongly on job- and firm-specific human capital. These specific skills may 
transfer less easily from one job and firm to another than general educational credentials 
(Schmelzer 2011). As a consequence, the upper-middle class may fare better than the working 
class after a spell of unemployment.  
However, the literature does not provide a clear-cut answer as to whether regression to the 
mean or cumulative advantage prevails. While several longitudinal studies find that high-
income workers lose, in relative terms, more after an unemployment spell than low-income 
workers in Britain (Gregoy and Jukes 2001), Germany (Burda and Mertens 2001) as well as in 
Germany and the United States (DiPrete and McManus 2000, Gangl 2006), more recent 
evidence suggests that unemployment has the most severe effect on the poorest quintile in the 
Unites States and the middle quintile in Germany (Ehlert 2013). 
One possibility is that the two countervailing mechanisms cancel each other out. Our 
expectation is that having more resources to cope with unemployment should trump the risk of 
falling from a greater height that comes with a better paying pre-displacement job. Therefore, 
our first hypothesis deems a process of cumulative disadvantage to be the more likely outcome: 
H1: After an unemployment spell, the labour income of workers in higher class positions 
will recover more quickly – in relative terms – than those of workers in lower class positions.  
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The institutions compensating for income loss 
Labour markets 
Unemployment heightens economic insecurity because earnings from labour constitute the 
main source of income for most households. Yet the degree to which an unemployment spell 
effectively translates into economic hardship may vary across countries. Labour market 
institutions affect both the time it takes for unemployed workers to find a new job and the 
income levels associated with the new job (Gangl 2006).  
While our two-country comparison dissuades us from entering the large debate on the 
institutional embeddedness of labour markets, one concept seems helpful for the purpose of 
our study: the distinction between occupational and internal labour markets (Marsden 1990, 
Ehlert 2013: 88). Countries such as Germany or Switzerland are dominated by an occupational 
labour market with strong links between education, notably the apprenticeship system, and 
employment. Vocational degrees certify the skills that are required for specific occupations and 
provide clear signals to employers about workers’ qualifications. In contrast, countries such as 
Britain or the US come closer to internal labour markets where general education and on-the-
job training dominate and vocational skills are often acquired through work experience and 
specific to single firms (Schmelzer 2011). To the extent that vocational skills are specific to an 
entire occupation (and not a single firm), and nationally credentialed (and thus widely 
recognized by employers), human capital may be more easily portable from one employer to 
another in the German-speaking countries than the United Kingdom or United States (Bol & 
Van de Werfhorst, 2013, Korber 2019). As a result, our second hypothesis expects earnings 
losses to be smaller in Switzerland’s occupational than in the UK’s internal labour market: 
Hypothesis 2: an unemployment spell should be associated with a smaller loss in work 
income in Switzerland than in Britain.  
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Welfare states and the household 
The economic literature on job displacement mostly focuses on how unemployment affects 
labour market earnings (as exemplified by the overview in Couch and Placzek 2010: 574). 
However, the extent to which job loss entails economic insecurity and hampers life chances 
does not only depend on the labour market. Two more institutions crucially contribute to social 
security: the state and family (Esping-Andersen 1999, DiPrete 2002). 
Welfare states provide financial transfers and in-kind services and thus offer a critical safety 
net for the unemployed. Unemployment benefits serve as automatic stabilizers of income at 
both the macro-level of the economy and the micro-level of households. Yet the extent to which 
welfare states reduce the dependence of households on the labour market – the extent of 
decommodification – varies across countries and, within single countries, between population 
groups (Esping-Andersen 1990, DiPrete and McManuns 2000: 346 Ehlert 2013: 89). 
When a slack labour market hampers reemployment and welfare benefits are both modest 
and short-termed, the family provides a last coping strategy. By pooling resources among 
household members, families may cushion the consequences of an earnings loss. For economic 
well-being, the evolution of household income is at least as consequential as individual 
earnings because the household is the decisive unit of consumption for most people, most 
clearly so in terms of accommodation and durable goods.  
Of course, the three institutional sources of income interact. If the labour market is dynamic 
and finding a job straightforward, the welfare state does not have to provide an income for long 
and the household does not have to jump in. While the family is a core provider of social 
security across the Western world, it becomes particularly important in countries and periods 
where good jobs are few and government benefits meagre. The typical example is the family-
based welfare regime of Southern Europe (Esping-Andersen 1999). Yet Ehlert (2012) finds 
that also unemployed men in the USA strongly rely on household resources to maintain their 
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income, notably in comparison with unemployed men in Germany who, in turn, obtain greater 
support from the welfare state.   
Our study’s main focus is on identifying how the market (through work income) and state 
(through social benefits) moderate for different social classes the economic insecurity induced 
by an unemployment spell. While we do not analyse the role of the family directly, we calculate 
income losses both at the individual and household level. This informs us on the extent to which 
the pooling of work income in households – and thus typically among family members – 
compensates for individuals’ loss of earnings. This further allows us to distinguish the 
contribution of the welfare state at the individual and household level, and this distinction 
between an individual and household welfare buffer against income loss is not irrelevant. While 
individuals are the recipients of unemployment compensation, several other means-tested 
government benefits target the household, typically housing benefits and subsidies of health 
costs (Immervoll and Richardson 2011).  
Our study contrasts Britain with Switzerland and thus compares two welfare states moulded 
by the different logics of Beveridge and Bismarck (Bonoli 1997). In Switzerland’s corporatist 
welfare state, unemployment benefits are proportional to pre-displacement earnings and thus 
tend to maintain differences in status among the unemployed. Benefit entitlement is 
comparatively long (18 to 24 months after job loss), replacement rates are high (70 to 80 per 
cent of the pre-unemployment wage) and only capped at almost twice the national median 
wage. In contrast, Britain’s liberal welfare state hands out unemployment insurance for only 
six months and benefits are basically flat rate. Unemployed individuals depend to a greater 
extent on means-tested benefits such as a jobseeker allowance and housing benefits as well as 
exemptions from health costs and local taxes (Clasen 2011: 21-22). These transfers accrue to a 
large extent at the household level.  
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Available evidence suggests that income losses after job displacement are surprisingly 
similar across countries. An analysis of the British Household Panel finds that job displacement 
causes a short-term loss in income of nearly 40 per cent and a long-term loss of 10 per cent 
(Upward and Wright 2017: 24). These results for Britain are comparable to losses found for 
the USA (Couch and Placzek 2010) and Germany (Vossemer 2019: 8) where job displacement 
leads to an income fall of 40 per cent in the first and 15 percent after five years. 
Income losses in Britain do not seem to be mitigated much by welfare benefits (Upward and 
Wright 2017). In this respect, the British results strongly contrast with findings from Nordic 
countries, notably Norway where unemployment leads to smaller income losses because the 
drop in earnings from work is compensated by public transfers (Hardoy and Schøne 2014). 
Similarly, the stabilizing effect of the welfare state after job loss is stronger in Germany than 
in the United States (McManus and DiPrete 2000: 429, Ehlert 2010). For our country 
comparison, this suggests that the higher unemployment benefits and more generous transfer 
system in Switzerland should reduce income losses to a greater extent than in Britain. This 
leads us to formulate our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Government taxes and transfers compensate the relative loss of work income 
due to unemployment to a greater level in Switzerland than in Britain, both at the individual 
and household level. 
Data and measures 
Our analysis is based on two household panels, the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 1999-
2017 and the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) 2009-2017, also known as 
Understanding Society. Given that the Swiss Household Panel has a much smaller sample than 
Understanding Society, we need to take into account more years for Switzerland than the UK. 
Although the period under study for the UK coincides with the post-recession years, the 
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unemployment rate in the UK was only marginally higher in the decade after than before the 
Great Recession. It stood at an average of 3.9 per cent over the period 1999-2008 as compared 
to 4.5 per cent for 2009-2018. In Switzerland, the unemployment rate increased slightly more 
over time – from 3 per cent in 1999-2008 to 4.2 per cent in 2009-2018 – and thus reached a 
similar level as in the UK.3  
For both countries and datasets, we use all members of the original sample aged 24 to 62 
years who reported full interview outcomes, which results in an (unbalanced) sample panel of 
4,564 individuals and 48,363 person-years in Switzerland and 35,715 individuals and 395,354 
person-years in the UK. Attrition in SHP is comparable with other household panel surveys 
(e.g., BHPS, PSID): about 65 percent of respondents are retained after five waves for the 
original (Voorpostel et al., 2017) and the two refreshment samples compensate for the loss of 
observations. In UKHLS, 52% of the original sample was still participing six years after the 
beginning (Lynn and Borkowska 2018). While attrition is particularly high in the youngest 
group aged 16 to 19 in the first wave, note that they are not part of our analytical sample because 
they do not comply with the age requirements. 
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of income, measured with four different income 
concepts. The first concept of individual labour income includes wages from primary and 
secondary jobs, but not from self-employment. The second measure is individual post-
government labour income which additionally includes social security transfers, while 
subtracting taxes. The third measure is pre-government household income and captures the 
pooling of income among household members. The fourth and final concept is the post-
government household income, which adds social benefits and subtracts household taxes. In 
years when individuals do not have any earnings, we follow previous studies and assign a value 
 
3 Data extracted from OECD stat (https://stats.oecd.org/).  
12 
 
of zero income (e.g. Ehlert 2013, OECD 2013, Vossmer 2019).4 Pre- and post-government 
household income is adjusted for household size based on the OECD equivalence scale: the 
respondent is assigned a weight of 1, other adults are given a weight of 0.5 and children of 0.3. 
All incomes are deflated with the consumer price index. 
The key independent variable is a spell of self-reported unemployment that lasts at least one 
month after at least two months of continuous employment with positive wages.5 Our treatment 
thus measures whether individuals experience an episode of unemployment after having been 
in employment. This means that our focus is on transitions from employment to unemployment 
such as in Ehlert (2013) – and not on job loss or job displacement which may, or may not, result 
in a spell of unemployment. The reader should therefore be aware that our measure of 
unemployment is not an exogenous treatment – contrary to plant closure (Brand 2015). While 
we try to address this issue by combining a matching method with fixed-effects (see below), 
we cannot exclude that unobserved heterogeneity affects both the unemployment risk and the 
income trajectories.  
In the SHP, individuals report their employment status on a monthly basis in the activity 
calendar and income on an annual basis. In UKHLS, personal questionnaires reconstruct the 
work activity of respondents at the time of the interview as well as any labour market spell that 
began after the interview of the previous year. Both income and unemployment is reported on 
a monthly basis. We resolve any potential timing incongruence by assigning an unemployment 
spell to the first year of unemployment.  
For our analysis of heterogeneous effects, we stratify our sample by social class. We use a 
merged version of the scheme developed by Oesch (2006) and distinguish three employee 
 
4 In order to be able to calculate log income for spells with 0 income, we attribute an income of 1 to these spells.  
5 We run robustness checks with self-reported unemployment spells that lasts at least (a) two months or (b) six 
months and show these results in Figures W.2 to W.6 in the web-appendix. 
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classes: (1) the upper-middle class of managers and professionals; (2) the lower-middle class 
of associate managers, semi-professionals, technicians and skilled clerks; (3) the working class 
of craft, production, sales and service workers. These three categories closely echo the 
distinction made by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 36) between three types of employment 
regulation, namely the service relationship for occupations at the top, an intermediate form for 
middling occupations and the labour contract for working-class occupations at the bottom. We 
allocate wage-earners into one of the three classes based on detailed occupational information 
(at the level of ISCO 4-digit).  
Matching method 
Our analytical strategy tries to approach a causal design by explicitly addressing selection 
into unemployment. We thus compare individuals who experience unemployment (treatment 
group) with individuals who share similar socio-demographic characteristics and thus similar 
risks of becoming unemployed, but who do not experience unemployment over the period 
under study (control group).  
Under the potential outcome framework (Rubin 1974), each individual has two potential 
outcomes: 𝑌(1)%& indicates the income that an unemployed individual receives, and 𝑌(0)%& 
indicates the income if the same person had not become unemployed. Therefore, for each 
individual, the causal effect of being unemployed on income is defined as 𝑌(1)%& −	𝑌(0)%&. 
Because each individual is observed only in either the treatment or control group, we need to 
estimate the counterfactual income for a control group. 
As the control and treatment groups differ in characteristics that are relevant for both their 
risk of becoming unemployed and their income, we make them comparable with a matching 
approach that uses pre-displacement characteristics. For each individual who eventually 
becomes unemployed (in the treatment group), we look for one or more individuals who will 
not experience unemployment (in the control group), but who was the most similar to the 
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individual in the treatment group based on the observable characteristics a year before the onset 
of unemployment. Figure A.1 in the appendix illustrates our matching procedure.  
We use the method of coarsened exact matching (CEM, Iacus et al. 2011) which involves 
three steps.6 First, we temporarily coarsen control variables that may confound the influence 
of an unemployment spell on income by transforming them into categories. As an example, 
age was coarsened into three subgroups. Second, we sort all units into strata, each of which has 
the same values on the coarsened variables. Third, we prune from the dataset the units in any 
stratum that do not include at least one treated and one control unit. The covariates used for 
matching includes demographic characteristics (age, gender, having British or Swiss 
citizenship respectively), education (ISCED 0-2, 3-4, 5-6), number of hours worked, self-
perceived health (4 categories) and firm size (4 categories). Note that we do not use the three 
social classes for matching, but run our model for each of these three groups to examine the 
presence of heterogeneous effects.  
The two groups of individuals who will – and will not – experience an unemployment spell 
are matched in the same survey year so that both groups are exposed to the same business cycle. 
The year used for matching precedes the unemployment spell of the treatment group by two 
years and allows us to compare the income evolution of the two groups over the subsequent 
waves.  
Our design uses a difference-in-differences model and is thus based on the assumption of 
parallel trends – that is, that in the absence of an unemployment spell, the incomes of treatment 
and control groups would have evolved in parallel. Figures A.2 and A.3 (in the appendix) 
 
6 We examine the robustness of our findings by using other matching methods, such as propensity score matching 
with different algorithms (radius and nearest neighbor) and specifications (different caliper values). Results 
remain unchanged and are available from the authors. 
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suggest that this assumption is plausible for both countries during the five years preceding an 
unemployment spell. 
Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix show the descriptive statistics of the treatment and control 
group. For a number of individuals in the treatment group, there was no comparable individual 
in the control group (that is, the CEM algorithm did not find any matching between the two 
groups). These observations were deleted from the analysis. Moreover, the total number of 
unemployment episodes is larger than the number of individuals losing at least once their jobs 
because some individuals experienced several unemployment spells.7 
Regression model 
We combine our matching method with a fixed-effects panel model to estimate the effect 
of unemployment on income (Hallaby 2004). The fixed-effects estimator only uses the within-
variance stemming from changes in workers’ lives over time. This eliminates all observed and 
unobserved characteristics of the individual that are time-constant such as personality and 
abilities which may affect both the likelihood to become unemployed and the evolution of 
income.8 Our model is based on the following equation:  
𝑌%& = 	𝛼% + - 𝛽/𝑇/1/231 + - 𝛾/𝑈%𝑇/1/231 +	𝑋%& + 𝜐%& 
 
7 Unemployment can occur several times during the observation window. Following Ehlert (2013), we therefore 
constructed a data set consisting of five-year episodes – two before and three after the beginning of each 
unemployment spell. If a person became unemployed twice, there will be two (possibly overlapping) episodes. 
In other words, episodes of unemployment are nested within individuals. 
8 A fixed-effects model without matching would control for time-invariant unobserved variables of the individuals 
who experience unemployment, but it would not address the systematic difference of people who experience 
unemployment and people who do not experience unemployment. Further, a fixed-effects model can only 
feature the treated individuals. The results of the Fixed-Effects models are shown in the web-appendix (tables 
W.1 for the UK and W.2 for Switzerland) and they lead to the same conclusions as the model using matching 
(compare with Tables A.4 and A.4 in the appendix).   
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Where 𝑌%& is the income for person (or household) j at time t. 𝑇/ indicates the yearly time 
dummies for the kth relative to the reference year, and 𝛽/ represents the associated coefficients 
and shows the income growth for the control group. 𝑈% is a binary measure for workers 
experiencing an unemployment spell and is interacted with the time dummies 𝑇/. Therefore, 
the coefficient 𝛾/ captures the income loss of the unemployed. 𝑋%& additionally controls for 
time-varying socio-demographic characteristics such as age, presence of a partner, children and 
survey years (aggregated into multi-year groups). 𝛼% is the individual fixed effect, while 𝜐%& 
captures idiosyncratic errors. We use clustered standard errors at the individual level because 
the observations are not independent over time. Since log changes are only equal to percentage 
differences for small quantities, we show all our results in percentages by converting log points 
into percentage points.  
Income losses of the entire workforce 
We begin our analysis by focusing on income loss for the entire sample. Figure 1 shows 
that an unemployment spell in the UK leads to a total loss of individual labour income of more 
than 55% in the year of unemployment (see Table A.4 in the appendix for the coefficients). In 
the subsequent two years, the losses decrease to 29% and 25% of pre-unemployment earnings. 
State transfers in the UK are surprisingly ineffective as they reduce income losses at the 
individual level by no more than 8 percentage points.  
At the household level, losses in pre-government income are more limited as they fall by 
about 23% in the first year of unemployment and by about 15% and 10% in the two following 
years. The pooling of income from several members means that a given loss at the individual 
level makes up a smaller part of total household income. Still, the impact of state transfers in 
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the UK is also modest at the household level. Factoring in government benefits reduces the 
income losses only by a few percentage points. 
Figure 2 shows for Switzerland that workers lose on average 20% of their pre-government 
labour income in the year when unemployment takes place. The loss then further increases to 
25% in the second year (see Table A.5 for the coefficients).9 Labour incomes recover two years 
later when losses decrease to about 15%. Compared to the UK, state benefits are much more 
consequential in Switzerland. Once government transfers and taxes are added on, income losses 
are halved. Post-government individual income losses range between 8 and 13% in the three 
years that follow the beginning of an unemployment spell. Income losses at the household level 
are almost divided by two in comparison to individual income losses. If we further account for 
state transfers and taxes at the household level, an unemployment spell leads to income losses 
of no more than annually 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 The reason why our results show larger income losses for T1  than  T0 is linked to the structure of Switzerland’s 
panel data: the collection of information on income does not refer to the ongoing calendar year (for instance: 
income reported in year x might refer to the period September x-1 – September x) while unemployment 
histories are synchronized with the calendar year. 
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Figure 1. Changes in income after an unemployment spell in the United Kingdom (in %) 
   
Figure 2. Changes in income after an unemployment spell in Switzerland (in %) 
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In Table 1, we provide summary measures that disentangle the contribution of income from 
different sources. Column 1 shows the importance of the individual welfare buffer: the extent 
to which post-unemployment incomes losses are reduced by state transfers and taxes at the 
individual level. Column 2 reveals the contribution of the household welfare buffer: the extent 
to which income losses are further moderated by state transfers and taxes at the household 
level. This overview suggests that welfare state transfers are much more effective in 
Switzerland. In the first and second year after an unemployment spell, they reduce income 
losses by 8 to 14 percentage points at the individual level and by 5 to 11 percentage points at 
the household level. In the UK, the impact of state transfers is weak at the level of both 
individuals – where it compensates for 4 to 8 percentage points at most – and households where 
it compensates for no more than 2 to 3 percentage points of the income losses.   
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Table 1. The contribution of state transfers and taxes to income after an unemployment spell 
at the individual and household level (change in income in percentage points) 10 
 (1) Individual welfare buffer:  
Post-government minus pre-government 
individual labour income  
(2) Household welfare buffer:  
Post-government minus pre-
government household income 
 United Kingdom 
T0 0.08 0.02 
T1 0.04 0.03 
T2 0.06 0.02 
 Switzerland 
T0 0.08 0.05 
T1 0.14 0.11 
T2 0.08 0.06 
Income losses by social class 
We turn to the analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects and show in Figures 3 and 4 how 
unemployment affects earnings for each of the social classes (see Tables A.6 to A.11 for the 
coefficients). For Britain, Figure 3 shows that earnings losses are larger in the upper-middle 
than in the working class, namely about 64% in T0 and 37% T1 in the upper-middle class as 
compared to 45% and 23% for the working class. Again, income losses are halved at the 
household level. Although state transfers do not make much of a difference in the UK overall, 
earnings losses in working-class households are lno higher than 10% two years after an 
 
10 Following DiPrete and McManus (2000) and Ehlert (2013), we calculate the contribution of state transfers 
and taxes as the difference between pre-government individual labour income and post-government individual 
labour income: 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡	(𝚤𝑛𝑑𝚤𝑣𝚤𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙) = 𝛿GHIJK −𝛿GHI 
Where 𝛿GL represents the estimated coefficients of pre-government individual labour income changes (LI) and 
post-government individual income (LIG). At the household level, we calculate the contribution of state transfers 
and taxes as the difference between pre-government and post-government household income. 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡	(ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑) = 𝛿GOPQ&JK −𝛿GORSJ 
21 
 
unemployment spell. These results suggest that unemployment does not lead to a process of 
cumulative disadvantage in Britain.  
In Switzerland, there are no clear differences in income losses across social classes (Figure 
5). Losses are somewhat larger for the lower-middle class in the two years after unemployment 
(at T1 and T2) in terms of individual pre- and post-government labour income. With respect to 
post-government household earnings, recovery is particularly strong for the working class 
where income losses appear marginal.  
 
Figure 3. Changes in income after an unemployment spell by social class in the UK (in %)  
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Figure 4. Changes in income after an unemployment spell by class in Switzerland (in %) 
  
Table 2 presents again how the welfare state reduces income losses for the three classes at 
the individual and household level. In the United Kingdom, the effect of government benefits 
is somewhat stronger for the upper-middle and, above all, lower-middle class than the working 
class when looking at the individual level. However, at the level of the household, state 
transfers are more consequential as an income stabilizer for the working class than either the 
lower-middle or upper-middle classes, where taxes paid and transfers received seem to cancel 
each other out. This is not surprising given that housing benefits, exemptions from health costs 
and local taxes in the UK are all based on means-testing and set at the household level, therefore 
being of greater benefit to poorer households than middle-class households.  
In Switzerland, the welfare state does not only provide a stronger buffer than in the United 
Kingdom, but its effect is also much more even across social classes – both at the individual 
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and household level. Given the variance over the years, the safest conclusion is that the three 
classes benefit to a similar extent from state transfers after an unemployment spell.  
Table 2. The contribution of state transfers and taxes to income after an unemployment spell 
at the individual and household level for social classes (change in income in percentage points) 
 (1) Individual welfare buffer:  
Post-government minus pre-government 
individual labour income  
(2) Household welfare buffer:  
Post-government minus pre-
government household income 
 United Kingdom 
 Upper-
middle  
Lower-
middle 
Working 
class 
Upper-
middle  
Lower-
middle 
Working 
class 
T0 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.02 
T1 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.06 
T2 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.03 
 Switzerland 
 Upper-
middle  
Lower-
middle 
Working 
class 
Upper-
middle  
Lower-
middle 
Working 
class 
T0 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.03 
T1 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.06 
T2 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.02 
Discussion  
A central question raised by our paper is whether these income losses vary across social 
classes. Contrary to our expectation, the empirical evidence does not provide much support for 
the existence of heterogeneous treatment effects. Our first hypothesis expected people in 
advantageous class positions to fare better in both countries. Yet our results indicate that 
income losses do not differ systematically across social strata. There are a few exceptions: The 
working class bears lower losses in post-government household incomes in both countries as 
opposed to the lower-middle and upper-middle class. This may be the consequence of a floor 
effect as the incomes at the bottom of the class structure fall from a lower level and the extent 
of this fall is limited by minimum benefit levels. 
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Our analysis shows that individual labour income drops in the first two years after an 
unemployment spell by 20% and 25% in Switzerland and by 55% and 25% in Britain. As 
expected by our second hypothesis, an episode of unemployment thus seems to lead to lower 
earnings losses in Switzerland’s occupational labour market than in Britain’s internal labour 
market, where skill transferability across firms may be more limited.  
Unemployed workers in Switzerland do not only suffer lower losses in labour income, they 
also benefit more from the welfare state than is the case for the unemployed in the UK. 
Consistent with our third hypothesis, state transfers reduce income losses to a much larger 
extent in Switzerland than in the UK, both at the individual and household level. In the UK, 
government transfers make a surprisingly weak contribution to stabilizing the income of the 
unemployed. This leaves displaced workers with basically two options: to either return as 
quickly as possible to the labour market or to rely on the support of other household members. 
In relative terms, the pooling of income within households thus plays a larger role for income 
buffering in the UK than in Switzerland. 
Conclusion 
Our findings provide little evidence for heterogeneous income effects of unemployment on 
social classes. How much confidence can we place in this result? We apply a difference-in-
differences design to panel data from two countries and combine fixed-effects regressions with 
a matching method. Still, our design only approximates a causal inference design because 
unemployment spells may not be exogenous to the evolution of income. This is the case if the 
same unobserved (and time-changing) characteristics increase the likelihood of both stagnating 
incomes and unemployment.  
This caveat needs to be taken seriously. At the same time, researchers are more likely to 
mistake an effect that is actually homogeneous as being heterogeneous. This argument is made 
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by Richard Breen and colleagues (2015) who show that unobserved selection into the treatment 
group (unemployment in our case, college education in their study) increases the risk of 
erroneously finding heterogeneous causal effects (income differences across classes in our 
case, income differences across SES-groups in their study). To the extent that our analysis 
shows small differences in income losses across social classes, the safest bet is to conclude that 
there is not much causal heterogeneity.  
The widely varying results reported in the literature – with larger income losses found for 
high-income households in some studies, but for low- or mid-income household in other studies 
– also suggest that there may be no systematic stratification of income losses after a spell of 
unemployment. This finding implies that the greater risk of becoming unemployed of lower 
classes does not automatically translate into greater vulnerability to its consequences once they 
are unemployed. At least for the United Kingdom and Switzerland over the last decade, our 
panel data provide no evidence that unemployed workers are subject to this mechanism of 
cumulative disadvantage. 
Of course, an income loss of 20 percent may be much more hurtful for people who had very 
low earnings to begin with than for individuals who earned comfortable wages before 
becoming unemployed. Notably, an identical income drop of 20 percent may have very 
different consequences for economic deprivation in the upper-middle than the working class if 
the incomes of the latter are pushed below the poverty line. Seen in this perspective, 
unemployment spells are not only more frequent in the working careers of lower classes, but 
may also be more disruptive.  
At the same time, if we measured income changes in absolute terms (and thus in Pound 
Sterling and Swiss Francs) rather than in relative terms (using logged income), a relative 
income loss of 20 per cent would show up as a substantially larger absolute fall for the upper-
middle than the working class. Based on absolute measures, our results would clearly lead us 
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to reject the hypothesis that income losses after an unemployment spell are larger for 
individuals from less advantageous social classes.  
While there may be disagreement on what our results mean for cumulative disadvantages, 
what is undisputable are the large country differences in how unemployed workers are buffered 
against falling incomes. The Swiss welfare state reduces the incomes losses after an 
unemployment spell by half, whereas the British welfare state provides minimal protection. In 
this sense, unemployment in the UK is a critical life event for which institutions offer little help 
and which exposes individuals across the class distribution to great economic insecurity.  
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Appendix - Figures 
 
Figure A.1: general matching design  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
30 
 
Figure A.2: Trends of individual income and post-government household income of the 
treatment and control group in the 5 years preceding a unemployment spell, United Kingdom 
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Figure A.3: Trends of individual income and post-government household income of the 
treatment and control group in the 5 years preceding a unemployment spell, Switzerland 
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Appendix - Tables 
 
Table A.1: Characteristics of treated and control group in the UK 
 Treated   Control 
 Pre-matching Post-matching Pre-matching Post-matching 
 Mean Sd 
Mea
n 
Sd 
Mea
n 
Sd Mean Sd 
Age 
39,08 14,24 
41,3
6 14,23 
42,8
3 
10,1
7 43,77 10,37 
Male 0,54 0,50 0,55 0,50 0,48 0,50 0,48 0,50 
Partner 0,59 0,49 0,61 0,49 0,76 0,43 0,76 0,43 
British 0,36 0,48 0,07 0,26 0,05 0,22 0,08 0,27 
Dependent children: 0 0,66 0,47 0,66 0,47 0,51 0,50 0,53 0,50 
1 0,15 0,36 0,14 0,35 0,19 0,40 0,19 0,39 
2 0,14 0,34 0,14 0,35 0,20 0,40 0,20 0,40 
3+ 0,05 0,23 0,06 0,24 0,09 0,29 0,09 0,29 
Oesch groups: Lower 0,24 0,43 0,22 0,42 0,25 0,44 0,26 0,44 
Intermediate 0,32 0,47 0,32 0,47 0,35 0,48 0,34 0,48 
Higher 0,44 0,50 0,45 0,50 0,40 0,49 0,40 0,49 
Firm size: 1 - 19 0,31 0,46 0,19 0,39 0,20 0,40 0,20 0,40 
20-99 0,20 0,40 0,14 0,35 0,17 0,37 0,17 0,38 
99-1000 0,31 0,46 0,20 0,40 0,31 0,46 0,31 0,46 
Missing 0,18 0,39 0,47 0,50 0,32 0,47 0,31 0,46 
Work hours: Full time 0,56 0,50 0,38 0,48 0,59 0,49 0,59 0,49 
Part time 0,23 0,42 0,12 0,32 0,15 0,36 0,15 0,36 
Missing 0,21 0,41 0,50 0,50 0,26 0,44 0,26 0,44 
Health: Very well 0,12 0,32 0,07 0,26 0,17 0,37 0,15 0,36 
Well 0,09 0,29 0,10 0,30 0,08 0,27 0,08 0,28 
Average 0,33 0,47 0,35 0,48 0,33 0,47 0,33 0,47 
Not well/ at all 0,35 0,48 0,35 0,48 0,29 0,46 0,30 0,46 
Missing  0,08 0,28 0,10 0,29 0,09 0,28 0,09 0,29 
 
  
33 
 
Table A.2: Characteristics of treated and control group in Switzerland 
 Treated Control 
 Pre-matching Post-matching Pre-matching Post-matching 
 Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Mea
n Sd Mean Sd 
Age 42,51 9,84 43,34 10,44 
43,9
0 8,84 45,44 8,92 
Male 0,61 0,49 0,60 0,49 0,51 0,50 0,51 0,50 
Partner 0,59 0,49 0,59 0,49 0,78 0,41 0,79 0,41 
Swiss 0,82 0,38 0,83 0,37 0,97 0,16 0,97 0,16 
Dependent children: 0 0,65 0,48 0,66 0,47 0,52 0,50 0,54 0,50 
1 0,15 0,36 0,14 0,35 0,15 0,36 0,16 0,36 
2 0,15 0,35 0,16 0,37 0,22 0,42 0,21 0,41 
3+ 0,05 0,22 0,04 0,19 0,11 0,31 0,09 0,29 
ISEI: 1st tercile 0,31 0,46 0,30 0,46 0,27 0,44 0,27 0,44 
2nd tercile 0,42 0,49 0,38 0,49 0,49 0,50 0,48 0,50 
3rd tercile 0,28 0,45 0,32 0,47 0,25 0,43 0,25 0,43 
Firm size: 1 – 19 0,16 0,37 0,16 0,37 0,19 0,39 0,19 0,39 
20-99 0,23 0,42 0,23 0,42 0,28 0,45 0,28 0,45 
99-1000 0,61 0,49 0,61 0,49 0,53 0,50 0,53 0,50 
Missing 0,31 0,46 0,23 0,42 0,33 0,47 0,33 0,47 
Work hours: Full time 0.42 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.43 0.49 
Part time 0.41 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.55 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Missing 0.18 0.37 0.39 0.49 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 
Health: Very well 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.38 
Well 0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.66 0.47 0.72 0.45 
Average 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 
Not well/ at all 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.18 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 
Missing  0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15 
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of individuals’ characteristics by employment status 
 United Kingdom Switzerland 
Full sample No U/E U/E No U/E U/E 
Age 40,43 42,37 38,66 40,35 
Gender (Male) 0,45 0,51 0,49 0,63 
Partner 0,70 0,69 0,77 0,66 
ISCED 1-2 0,58 0,56 0,58 0,62 
ISCED 3-4 0,17 0,17 0,19 0,20 
ISCED 5-6 0,25 0,28 0,23 0,18 
Individuals - Matched 32272 3443 4128 436 
Individuals - Not matched 27852 1355 4497 67 
Episodes - Matched 33116 3932 4135 518 
Episodes - Not matched 28346 1360 4579 74 
     
Social class – Higher group No U/E U/E No U/E U/E 
Age 40,65 43,58 39,35 40,52 
Gender (Male) 0,54 0,56 0,33 0,45 
Partner 0,76 0,74 0,79 0,67 
ISCED 1-2 0,33 0,33 0,27 0,30 
ISCED 3-4 0,15 0,15 0,38 0,36 
ISCED 5-6 0,51 0,51 0,35 0,34 
Individuals - Matched 8571 951 1181 131 
Individuals - Not matched 9290 164 1297 15 
Episodes - Matched 8983 1098 1183 152 
Episodes - Not matched 9439 166 1318 17 
     
Social class – Middle group No U/E U/E No U/E U/E 
Age 39,83 42,18 38,43 40,35 
Gender (Male) 0,34 0,37 0,61 0,71 
Partner 0,70 0,69 0,75 0,64 
ISCED 1-2 0,48 0,49 0,66 0,73 
ISCED 3-4 0,23 0,23 0,14 0,15 
ISCED 5-6 0,29 0,29 0,20 0,12 
Individuals - Matched  9140 1171 1837 192 
Individuals - Not matched 9588 357 2008 21 
Episodes - Matched 9358 1341 1839 236 
Episodes - Not matched 9758 357 2052 23 
     
Social class – Lower group No U/E U/E No U/E U/E 
Age 40,77 41,66 38,33 40,18 
Gender (Male) 0,49 0,61 0,45 0,66 
Partner 0,67 0,65 0,80 0,66 
ISCED 1-2 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,77 
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ISCED 3-4 0,13 0,12 0,06 0,13 
ISCED 5-6 0,08 0,10 0,16 0,10 
Individuals - Matched 14561 1321 1110 113 
Individuals - Not matched 8974 834 1192 31 
Episodes - Matched 14775 1493 1113 130 
Episodes - Not matched 9149 837 1209 34 
 
Table A.4: Post-matching fixed-effects regressions with the full sample in the UK 
 
Individual 
Labor income 
Individual 
labor income      
+transfers 
Household pre-
government  
income 
Household 
post-government  
income 
T-1 -0,01** -0,01*** -0,00*** -0,00*** 
 (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,001) 
T0 0,01*** 0,01*** 0,00 0,00*** 
 (0,003) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) 
T1 -0,00 -0,00 -0,01*** -0,00* 
 (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
T2 -0,00* -0,00* -0,01*** -0,01*** 
 (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
T-2*D 0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,00 
 (0,045) (0,036) (0,035) (0,032) 
T0*D -0,82*** -0,66*** -0,25*** -0,24*** 
 (0,037) (0,024) (0,015) (0,013) 
T1*D -0,35*** -0,28*** -0,16*** -0,13*** 
 (0,031) (0,021) (0,016) (0,014) 
T2*D -0,30*** -0,21*** -0,15*** -0,13*** 
 (0,032) (0,022) (0,019) (0,017) 
Age 0,11*** 0,10*** 0,08*** 0,08*** 
 (0,013) (0,010) (0,011) (0,009) 
Age2 -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Wave 2 -0,02 -0,00 -0,07*** -0,06*** 
 (0,015) (0,011) (0,011) (0,009) 
Wave 3 -0,04 -0,02 -0,11*** -0,08*** 
 (0,026) (0,019) (0,019) (0,016) 
Wave 4 -0,05 -0,03 -0,13*** -0,11*** 
 (0,036) (0,028) (0,028) (0,023) 
Wave 5 -0,06 -0,04 -0,13*** -0,11*** 
 (0,048) (0,037) (0,037) (0,030) 
Wave 6 -0,01 -0,00 -0,10** -0,08** 
36 
 
 (0,058) (0,045) (0,046) (0,036) 
Wave 7 -0,01** -0,01*** -0,00*** -0,00*** 
 (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,001) 
     
Observations 395354 395354 395354 395354 
R-Squared 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,03 
Number of id 35715 35715 35715 35715 
Rho 0,863 0,751 0,822 0,815 
Sigma 1,736 0,959 1,065 0,847 
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Table A.5: Post-matching fixed-effects regressions with the full sample in Switzerland 
 
Individual 
Labor income 
Individual 
labor income      
+transfers 
Household pre-
government  
income 
Household 
post-government  
income 
T-2 -0,00 -0,00 0,00 0,00 
 (0,007) (0,008) (0,006) (0,006) 
T0 0,00 0,01 -0,00 -0,00 
 (0,008) (0,007) (0,006) (0,006) 
T1 -0,00 0,02** 0,00 -0,00 
 (0,009) (0,008) (0,006) (0,006) 
T2 -0,00 0,02** -0,01 -0,01* 
 (0,010) (0,009) (0,007) (0,007) 
T-2*D 0,05 0,03 0,02 0,01 
 (0,030) (0,023) (0,026) (0,020) 
T0*D -0,22*** -0,13*** -0,12*** -0,06** 
 (0,036) (0,025) (0,027) (0,022) 
T1*D -0,30*** -0,16*** -0,21*** -0,10*** 
 (0,047) (0,034) (0,032) (0,024) 
T2*D -0,16*** -0,13*** -0,12*** -0,08*** 
 (0,050) (0,039) (0,035) (0,029) 
Age 0,07*** 0,05*** 0,04*** 0,06*** 
 (0,014) (0,013) (0,015) (0,013) 
Age2 -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Years 2001-2002 0,00 -0,00 0,02 0,02 
 (0,022) (0,020) (0,018) (0,017) 
Years 2003-2004 -0,04 -0,03 -0,00 0,02 
 (0,034) (0,029) (0,027) (0,024) 
Years 2005-2006 -0,06 -0,04 0,00 0,01 
 (0,041) (0,039) (0,035) (0,031) 
Years 2007-2008 -0,06 -0,03 0,03 0,04 
 (0,053) (0,050) (0,043) (0,038) 
Years 2009-2010 -0,06 -0,01 0,02 0,04 
 (0,064) (0,059) (0,051) (0,045) 
Years 2011-2012 -0,06 -0,01 0,05 0,05 
 (0,074) (0,068) (0,056) (0,051) 
Years 2013-2014 0,00 0,03 0,05 0,03 
 (0,087) (0,077) (0,061) (0,058) 
Years 2015-2016 0,02 0,04 0,07 0,01 
 (0,098) (0,087) (0,073) (0,067) 
     
Observations 48363 48363 48363 48363 
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R-Squared 0,04 0,04 0,02 0,04 
Number of id 4564 4564 4564 4564 
Rho 0,809 0,815 0,713 0,722 
Sigma 0,910 0,884 0,644 0,626 
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Table A.6: Post-matching fixed-effects regressions for the upper-middle class in the UK 
 
Individual 
Labor income 
Individual 
labor income      
+transfers 
Household pre-
government  
income 
Household 
post-government  
income 
T-1 -0,01** -0,01*** -0,01** -0,00** 
 (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) 
T0 0,01*** 0,01*** 0,00 0,00 
 (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) 
T1 -0,01* -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 
 (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) 
T2 -0,01*** -0,01** -0,01*** -0,01*** 
 (0,004) (0,004) (0,003) (0,002) 
T-2*D -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,02 
 (0,050) (0,042) (0,023) (0,022) 
T0*D -1,02*** -0,85*** -0,32*** -0,32*** 
 (0,078) (0,056) (0,033) (0,032) 
T1*D -0,47*** -0,34*** -0,19*** -0,19*** 
 (0,064) (0,051) (0,034) (0,032) 
T2*D -0,37*** -0,28*** -0,20*** -0,20*** 
 (0,070) (0,052) (0,038) (0,036) 
Age 0,14*** 0,13*** 0,10*** 0,10*** 
 (0,025) (0,024) (0,018) (0,016) 
Age2 -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Wave 2 -0,04 -0,03 -0,07*** -0,06*** 
 (0,028) (0,027) (0,017) (0,016) 
Wave 3 -0,10** -0,08 -0,11*** -0,09*** 
 (0,048) (0,047) (0,031) (0,028) 
Wave 4 -0,15** -0,11 -0,15*** -0,13*** 
 (0,069) (0,068) (0,045) (0,040) 
Wave 5 -0,18* -0,13 -0,15*** -0,12** 
 (0,093) (0,092) (0,059) (0,052) 
Wave 6 -0,15 -0,10 -0,13* -0,09 
 (0,113) (0,112) (0,073) (0,065) 
Wave 7 -0,20 -0,13 -0,15* -0,10 
 (0,135) (0,133) (0,088) (0,078) 
     
Observations 117649 117649 117649 117649 
R-Squared 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,02 
Number of id 9522 9522 9522 9522 
Rho 0,837 0,777 0,827 0,819 
Sigma 1,317 1,018 0,885 0,813 
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Table A.7: Post-matching fixed-effects regressions for the lower-middle class in the UK 
  Individual 
Labor income 
Individual 
labor income      
+transfers 
Household pre-
government  
income 
Household 
post-government  
income 
T-1 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 0,00 
 (0,005) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) 
T0 0,02*** 0,01*** 0,00 0,00** 
 (0,005) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) 
T1 0,01 0,00 -0,00 -0,00 
 (0,004) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) 
T2 0,00 0,00 -0,00 -0,00* 
 (0,004) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) 
T-2*D -0,03  -0,02  -0,02 -0,02  
 (0,051) (0,037) (0,026) (0,026) 
T0*D -0,97*** -0,74*** -0,25*** -0,22*** 
 (0,069) (0,045) (0,025) (0,023) 
T1*D -0,55*** -0,37*** -0,17*** -0,15*** 
 (0,067) (0,044) (0,029) (0,027) 
T2*D -0,50*** -0,30*** -0,16*** -0,15*** 
 (0,071) (0,043) (0,036) (0,034) 
Age 0,07*** 0,07*** 0,06*** 0,05*** 
 (0,023) (0,016) (0,019) (0,014) 
Age2 -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Wave 2 -0,02 -0,00 -0,07*** -0,06*** 
 (0,023) (0,017) (0,019) (0,015) 
Wave 3 -0,02 -0,01 -0,09*** -0,07*** 
 (0,044) (0,029) (0,033) (0,026) 
Wave 4 0,01 -0,01 -0,10** -0,08** 
 (0,063) (0,042) (0,049) (0,037) 
Wave 5 0,02 -0,00 -0,08 -0,07 
 (0,083) (0,054) (0,064) (0,049) 
Wave 6 0,09 0,05 -0,03 -0,02 
 (0,102) (0,068) (0,078) (0,059) 
Wave 7 0,11 0,06 -0,02 -0,02 
 (0,122) (0,082) (0,094) (0,071) 
     
Observations 129195 129195 129195 129195 
R-Squared 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 
Number of id 10311 10311 10311 10311 
Rho 0,825 0,769 0,811 0,821 
Sigma 1,521 0,990 0,996 0,899 
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Table A.8: Post-matching fixed-effects regressions for the working class in the UK 
  Individual 
Labor income 
Individual 
labor income      
+transfers 
Household pre-
government  
income 
Household 
post-government  
income 
T-1 -0,00 -0,01*** -0,00 -0,01*** 
 (0,005) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) 
T0 0,01* 0,01*** -0,00 -0,00 
 (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
T1 -0,01 -0,00 -0,01*** -0,00 
 (0,005) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003) 
T2 -0,00 -0,00 -0,01** -0,01** 
 (0,004) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) 
T-2*D -0,02 -0,03  -0,02 -0,02 
 (0,038) (0,030) (0,024) (0,018) 
T0*D -0,59*** -0,50*** -0,22*** -0,20*** 
 (0,053) (0,033) (0,028) (0,022) 
T1*D -0,27*** -0,21*** -0,14*** -0,08*** 
 (0,047) (0,032) (0,030) (0,022) 
T2*D -0,26*** -0,18*** -0,14*** -0,10*** 
 (0,053) (0,038) (0,035) (0,028) 
Age 0,12*** 0,10*** 0,07*** 0,08*** 
 (0,023) (0,016) (0,021) (0,015) 
Age2 -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Wave 2 -0,01 -0,02 -0,08*** -0,06*** 
 (0,028) (0,016) (0,021) (0,016) 
Wave 3 -0,04 -0,03 -0,13*** -0,10*** 
 (0,044) (0,028) (0,037) (0,028) 
Wave 4 -0,08 -0,06 -0,16*** -0,13*** 
 (0,062) (0,041) (0,054) (0,041) 
Wave 5 -0,10 -0,09* -0,17** -0,15*** 
 (0,081) (0,054) (0,071) (0,053) 
Wave 6 -0,05 -0,06 -0,14 -0,13** 
 (0,098) (0,067) (0,088) (0,065) 
Wave 7 -0,07 -0,08 -0,15 -0,15* 
 (0,117) (0,080) (0,105) (0,077) 
     
Observations 148510 148510 148510 148510 
R-Squared 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 
Number of id 15882 15882 15882 15882 
Rho 0,898 0,788 0,843 0,870 
Sigma 2,027 0,903 1,197 1,029 
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Table A.9: Post-matching fixed-effects regressions for the upper-middle class in Switzerland 
  Individual 
Labor income 
Individual 
labor income      
+transfers 
Household pre-
government  
income 
Household 
post-government  
income 
T-2 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 
 (0,015) (0,014) (0,010) (0,009) 
T0 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,00 
 (0,017) (0,017) (0,013) (0,013) 
T1 0,04*** 0,04** 0,01 0,01 
 (0,016) (0,017) (0,016) (0,015) 
T2 0,05** 0,05** -0,01 -0,01 
 (0,020) (0,020) (0,018) (0,018) 
T-2*D 0,08 0,05 0,08  0,06* 
 (0,056) (0,043) (0,042) (0,033) 
T0*D -0,16** -0,09* -0,09* -0,04 
 (0,067) (0,047) (0,046) (0,036) 
T1*D -0,24*** -0,10** -0,20*** -0,10*** 
 (0,091) (0,063) (0,058) (0,044) 
T2*D -0,14 -0,14  -0,01 -0,04 
 (0,104) (0,081) (0,056) (0,054) 
Age 0,12*** 0,11*** 0,03 0,03 
 (0,024) (0,023) (0,034) (0,034) 
Age2 -0,00*** -0,00*** -0,00 -0,00 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Years 2001-2002 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 
 (0,032) (0,031) (0,041) (0,041) 
Years 2003-2004 -0,07 -0,05 0,01 0,04 
 (0,056) (0,053) (0,056) (0,055) 
Years 2005-2006 -0,09 -0,05 -0,05 -0,01 
 (0,069) (0,065) (0,062) (0,061) 
Years 2007-2008 -0,13 -0,09 -0,08 -0,02 
 (0,087) (0,083) (0,071) (0,069) 
Years 2009-2010 -0,12 -0,08 -0,08 -0,02 
 (0,104) (0,099) (0,087) (0,084) 
Years 2011-2012 -0,12 -0,07 -0,04 0,01 
 (0,126) (0,120) (0,098) (0,095) 
Years 2013-2014 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 
 (0,015) (0,014) (0,010) (0,009) 
Years 2015-2016 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,00 
 (0,017) (0,017) (0,013) (0,013) 
     
Observations 13429 13429 13429 13429 
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R-Squared 0,06 0,05 0,03 0,04 
Number of id 1312 1312 1312 1312 
Rho 0,769 0,781 0,674 0,673 
Sigma 0,817 0,785 0,587 0,557 
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Table A.10: Post-matching fixed-effects regressions for lower-middle class in Switzerland 
  Individual 
Labor income 
Individual 
labor income      
+transfers 
Household pre-
government  
income 
Household 
post-government  
income 
T-2 -0,02** -0,02** -0,01 -0,01 
 (0,009) (0,010) (0,009) (0,009) 
T0 -0,00 -0,01 -0,00 -0,00 
 (0,007) (0,007) (0,008) (0,009) 
T1 0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 
 (0,010) (0,010) (0,009) (0,009) 
T2 -0,00 -0,00 -0,01 -0,01 
 (0,012) (0,012) (0,010) (0,010) 
T-2*D 0,08* 0,05 -0,02 0,01 
 (0,043) (0,031) (0,044) (0,035) 
T0*D -0,27*** -0,11*** -0,19*** -0,09** 
 (0,051) (0,034) (0,047) (0,039) 
T1*D -0,33*** -0,17*** -0,20*** -0,07** 
 (0,068) (0,049) (0,054) (0,041) 
T2*D -0,22*** -0,13*** -0,18*** -0,10** 
 (0,075) (0,056) (0,063) (0,054) 
Age 0,04* 0,03 0,05*** 0,06*** 
 (0,021) (0,020) (0,015) (0,015) 
Age2 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00*** -0,00*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Years 2001-2002 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 
 (0,029) (0,029) (0,022) (0,022) 
Years 2003-2004 -0,03 0,00 -0,00 0,02 
 (0,037) (0,037) (0,032) (0,032) 
Years 2005-2006 -0,07 -0,03 -0,00 0,02 
 (0,050) (0,048) (0,043) (0,043) 
Years 2007-2008 -0,04 0,00 0,03 0,06 
 (0,065) (0,063) (0,055) (0,054) 
Years 2009-2010 -0,01 0,05 0,04 0,08 
 (0,079) (0,076) (0,066) (0,065) 
Years 2011-2012 -0,02 0,06 0,06 0,07 
 (0,091) (0,087) (0,076) (0,075) 
Years 2013-2014 -0,02** -0,02** -0,01 -0,01 
 (0,009) (0,010) (0,009) (0,009) 
Years 2015-2016 -0,00 -0,01 -0,00 -0,00 
 (0,007) (0,007) (0,008) (0,009) 
     
Observations 22213 22213 22213 22213 
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R-Squared 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,04 
Number of id 2029 2029 2029 2029 
Rho 0,811 0,820 0,714 0,734 
Sigma 0,872 0,848 0,632 0,628 
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Table A.11: Post-matching fixed-effects regressions for the working class in Switzerland 
  Individual 
Labor income 
Individual 
labor income      
+transfers 
Household pre-
government  
income 
Household 
post-government  
income 
T-2 0,01 0,01 0,02* 0,02* 
 (0,020) (0,020) (0,013) (0,013) 
T0 0,03* 0,03* -0,01 -0,01 
 (0,017) (0,017) (0,013) (0,012) 
T1 0,03 0,03 -0,00 -0,00 
 (0,020) (0,020) (0,015) (0,013) 
T2 0,03 0,03 -0,02 -0,02 
 (0,024) (0,023) (0,018) (0,015) 
T-2*D 0,03 -0,01 -0,01 -0,04 
 (0,058) (0,051) (0,048) (0,039) 
T0*D -0,23*** -0,16*** -0,04 -0,03 
 (0,062) (0,055) (0,051) (0,043) 
T1*D -0,21*** -0,08 -0,09  -0,05 
 (0,082) (0,067) (0,059) (0,047) 
T2*D -0,08 -0,03 -0,04 -0,04 
 (0,084) (0,072) (0,068) (0,047) 
Age 0,02 0,03 -0,00 0,03 
 (0,032) (0,031) (0,053) (0,036) 
Age2 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) 
Years 2001-2002 -0,01 -0,03 0,06 0,03 
 (0,049) (0,047) (0,041) (0,035) 
Years 2003-2004 -0,01 -0,03 0,04 0,02 
 (0,071) (0,070) (0,067) (0,048) 
Years 2005-2006 -0,03 -0,04 0,12 0,07 
 (0,100) (0,098) (0,096) (0,069) 
Years 2007-2008 -0,00 -0,03 0,21* 0,14* 
 (0,128) (0,126) (0,119) (0,084) 
Years 2009-2010 0,01 -0,01 0,22 0,14 
 (0,152) (0,150) (0,136) (0,099) 
Years 2011-2012 0,03 0,00 0,27* 0,17 
 (0,169) (0,166) (0,140) (0,107) 
Years 2013-2014 0,01 0,01 0,02* 0,02* 
 (0,020) (0,020) (0,013) (0,013) 
Years 2015-2016 0,03* 0,03* -0,01 -0,01 
 (0,017) (0,017) (0,013) (0,012) 
     
Observations 12158 12158 12158 12158 
R-Squared 0,04 0,04 0,01 0,02 
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Number of id 1223 1223 1223 1223 
Rho 0,834 0,836 0,696 0,704 
Sigma 0,978 0,962 0,649 0,631 
     
 
 
 
